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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKee, Circuit Judge. 
 
Olga Dressler appeals from the judgment of the district 
court in favor of defendant, Busch Entertainment Corp. 
Dressler sued Busch for injuries to her back that she 
maintains she sustained during a fall at an amusement 
theme park owned by Busch. She alleges that the trial 
court erred in instructing the jury, and in limiting her 
expert witness' testimony. For the reasons that follow, we 
agree that the trial court's jury instructions were erroneous, 
and will reverse the judgment and order of the district court 
and remand for a new trial.1 
 
I. 
 
On August 25, 1993, Olga Dressler and her son, Jason, 
visited Sesame Place, an amusement park in Langhorne, 
Pennsylvania that is owned by Busch Entertainment 
Corporation. Dressler purportedly injured her back as she 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Since we are granting a new trial, we need not address Dressler's 
assertions of error based upon the district court's restriction of her 
expert witness. Upon retrial, the issues of surprise and prejudice that 
are at the heart of the parties' arguments on that issue on appeal will be 
moot. 
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fell going down a step leading into a shallow pool that was 
part of an attraction known as the "Rubber Ducky Rapids." 
Thereafter, she underwent lumbar disc surgery in an effort 
to correct her back injury, and alleviate her pain. Dressler 
is a registered nurse, and claims that she is now unable to 
perform the duties of her profession because of back pain. 
 
Dressler filed suit in the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on August 17, 1995 to 
recover damages for the injury that she claims resulted 
from the fall. The matter was thereafter referred to a 
magistrate judge for trial. See 28 U.S.C. S 636(c). 
 
Dressler maintained that she slipped and fell because she 
did not see a downward sloping step which was under 
water and painted blue -- the same color as the rest of the 
pool. At trial, Dressler testified that when she slipped and 
fell, her "left leg flew up," App. at 97, her back made "a very 
loud cracking noise" and she "could hear people gasping" at 
the sight of her. App. at 93-94. Mary Bellantoni, Dressler's 
friend, was the only eyewitness to the accident. She 
corroborated Dressler's testimony regarding a fall and 
further testified that Dressler was "in shock" and "crying 
hysterically" afterwards. App. at 307. 
 
Dressler and Busch both presented expert testimony 
regarding the condition and design of the attraction, 
including the steps where Dressler fell. At the close of the 
evidence, Dressler requested that the trial court give the 
following jury instruction based upon a belief that the 
defense expert's testimony regarding the painting of the 
step was contradictory and contained willful falsifications: 
 
       If you decide that a witness has deliberately falsified 
       his testimony on a significatn [sic] point, you should 
       take this into consideration in deciding whether or not 
       to believe the rest of his testimony; and you may refuse 
       to believe the rest of his testimony, but you are not 
       required to do so. 
 
App. at 35. See Pennsylvania Bar Institute, Pennsylvania 
Suggested Standard Jury Instructions (Civ.) 5.05 (1981). The 
trial court refused to give the requested instruction, and 
instead used different language to explain how to assess 
testimony. Since the language that the court used is at the 
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heart of this appeal, we quote the relevant portion of the 
court's charge at length: 
 
       [Y]ou must decide which testimony to believe and 
       which testimony not to believe . . . . There are a number 
       of factors you may take into account . . . including the 
       following. 
 
       One, the witness' opportunity to observe the events he 
       described . . . . 
       Two, the witness' intelligence and memory. Three, the 
       witness' manner while testifying. Four, whether the 
       witness has any interest in the outcome of this case or 
       any bias or prejudice concerning any party or any 
       matter involved in the case. And five, the 
       reasonableness of the witness' testimony considered in 
       light of all of the evidence in the case. 
 
       Again, ask yourselves if the witness' testimony makes 
       sense to you . . . . Now if you find that a witness' 
       testimony is contradicted by what the witness has said 
       or done at another time, or by the testimony of other 
       witnesses, you may disbelieve all or any part of that 
       witness' testimony. 
 
       But in deciding whether or not to believe him or her, 
       keep this in mind, people sometimes forget things. A 
       contradiction may be an innocent lapse of memory or 
       it may be an intentional falsehood. Consider, therefore, 
       whether it has to do with an important fact or only a 
       small detail. Different people observing an event may 
       remember it differently and, therefore, testify about it 
       differently. 
 
       You may consider the factors I have discussed in 
       deciding how much weight to give to the testimony. It 
       is for you to say what weight you will give to the 
       testimony of any and all witnesses. If you believe that 
       any witness has willfully sworn falsely to any material 
       fact of this case or has willfully exaggerated any 
       evidence in this case you are at liberty to disbelieve the 
       testimony of that witness in whole or in part and 
       believe it in part or disbelieve it in part, taking in to 
       consideration all of the facts and circumstance of the 
       case. 
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App. at 696-98 (emphasis added). Dressler promptly 
objected, arguing that the court's phrasing of the 
instruction improperly told the jury that it could disbelieve 
the testimony of a witness it believed "willfully exaggerated" 
any evidence (emphasis added). This, Dressler contended, 
was contrary to the standard instruction that she had 
submitted. App. at 714. The court overruled Dressler's 
objection and, following deliberations, the jury returned a 
verdict in favor of defendant Busch. 
 
II. 
 
Dressler's disagreement with the trial court's instruction 
is twofold. She argues 1) that the court erroneous ly 
included willful exaggeration in its charge on willful 
falsification; and 2) that the court did not limit its willful 
exaggeration charge to material evidence, but, instead, 
allowed the jury to reject all of a witness's testimony based 
upon any exaggeration, even if immaterial to the issues in 
the suit. 
 
Our review of a trial court's jury instructions is plenary. 
Abrams v. Lightolier, Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1212 (3d Cir. 
1995). When we assess jury instructions we must look at 
the totality of the charge given to the jury, not merely a 
particular paragraph or sentence. See In re Braen, 900 F.2d 
621, 626 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Piccolo, 835 
F.2d 517, 520 (3d Cir. 1987)). "We review jury instructions 
to determine whether, if taken as a whole, they properly 
apprised the jury of the issues and the applicable law." Tigg 
Corp. v. Dow Corning, Corp., 962 F.2d 1119, 1123 (3d Cir. 
1992) (citing Gutzan v. Altair Airlines, Inc., 766 F.2d 135, 
138 (3d Cir. 1985)). "`The trial court should be reversed 
only if the instruction was capable of confusing and thereby 
misleading the jury."' United States v. Rockwell, 781 F.2d 
985, 991 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. Fischbach 
and Moore, Inc., 750 F.2d 1183, 1195 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
 
Busch argues that the totality of the portion of the charge 
set forth above properly informed the jury how to evaluate 
evidence. Busch cites our decision in Tigg to support its 
argument that the broad discretion that we afford trial 
courts in wording jury instructions requires us to defer to 
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the court's choice of language here. Appellee's Br. at 23; 
Tigg, 962 F.2d at 1123-24. 
 
In Tigg, plaintiff corporation sued the defendant 
corporation alleging breach of a requirements contract for 
an industrial product that Tigg was to supply to defendant. 
The jury returned a verdict for defendant, and plaintiff 
appealed alleging numerous errors in the court's jury 
instructions. We reviewed the court's charge to determine if 
it properly submitted the issues to the jury, and properly 
explained the legal principles that would guide the jury's 
analysis of the evidence. We reversed the judgment as to 
damages because the court's charge gave the jury the 
wrong test to use in determining damages. Here, despite 
Busch's argument to the contrary, the court's instructions 
gave the jury the wrong test to apply in deciding if a 
witness' testimony should be rejected in whole or in part. 
 
The terms "falsify" and "exaggerate" are not terms of art, 
consequently, their ordinary and plain meanings are 
sufficient to inform the jury. Webster's defines "falsify" as: 
"to engage in misrepresentation or distortion." Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary 820 (16th ed. 1981). 
Accordingly, "falsify" suggests an intent to deceive or 
mislead. On the other hand, "exaggerate" is defined as: "to 
enlarge beyond bounds or the truth." Id. at 790. 
Accordingly, the term includes an exclamation that 
overstates a fact or occurrence because of the excitement of 
the moment rather than bad faith. Dressler suggests that 
that is exactly what may have happened here. She argues 
that the excitement of the event may have caused both her 
and her eyewitness, Mary Bellantoni, to overstate what 
occurred. Dressler argues that the jury should not have 
been authorized to reject the totality of either her and 
Bellantoni's or any other witness' testimony based upon 
such an exaggeration, unless the exaggeration concerned 
testimony that was material to issues of liability or 
damages. 
 
Thus, testimony such as Bellantoni's statement that 
Dressler went into shock or Dressler's statement that she 
heard a "loud crack" did not justify rejecting all that either 
witness said because that testimony, even if exaggerated, 
was not relevant to the alleged negligent design of the steps 
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where Dressler fell. Busch, on the other hand, attempts to 
minimize any problem with the phrasing of the charge, 
arguing that the charge applied to its witnesses as well as 
Dressler's. Busch suggests that, since both sides may have 
exaggerated, Dressler cannot show any prejudice. Appellee's 
Br. at 24. However, that is not the point. When the jury is 
not informed of the test to apply to testimony, we cannot 
presume an absence of prejudice. Connecticut Mutual Life 
Insurance Co. v. Wyman, 718 F.2d 63, 64 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 
Dressler argues that the standard jury charge of 
numerous jurisdictions that include what is known as the 
falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus charge include an element 
of bad faith and materiality. Appellant's Br. at 11-12. The 
falsus in omnibus instruction must clearly state that the 
evidence in question must be material, "although . . . the 
word `material' need not be included if the essential 
meaning is conveyed by equivalent language." (footnote 
omitted) 4 A.L.R. 2d 1077, S 10. As noted above, here, the 
court told the jury: 
 
       If you believe that any witness has willfully sworn 
       falsely to any material fact of this case or willfully 
       exaggerated any evidence in this case you are at liberty 
       to disbelieve the testimony of that witness in whole or 
       in part and believe it in part or disbelieve it in part, 
       taking into consideration all of the facts and 
       circumstance of the case. 
 
App. at 697-98. Thus, the jury could disbelieve a witness if 
it concluded that a witness deliberately testified falsely as 
to a "material fact". There is nothing wrong with this part 
of the equation as it is consistent with the longstanding 
principles of jury deliberation.2 However, the jury was also 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In United States v. Rockwell, 781 F.2d 985, 988 (3d Cir. 1986), we 
concluded that the trial court's instruction "encroached upon the 
prerogative of the jury to independently assess the credibility of 
witnesses," Id. at 991, when the court issued the standard falsus in 
omnibus instruction and then followed it with an instruction on collateral 
evidence. The court stated: 
 
       If you find that any witness testified falsely about any material 
fact, 
       you may disregard all of his testimony, or you may accept such 
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told that it could disbelieve a witness if the witness 
exaggerated about any evidence. We have never held that 
an exaggeration, even if willful, regarding something that is 
immaterial to a jury's deliberation, could justify allowing a 
jury to reject the totality of a witness' testimony, nor has 
Busch provided us with any authority from any other 
jurisdiction that would support such a sweeping principle 
of law. 
 
Busch attempts to seize upon Dressler's citation to 
Hawaii's Civil Jury Instruction No. 5.3 to argue this novel 
principle. See Appellee's Br. at 22, n.4. Busch argues: 
 
       the model jury instructions from Hawaii, cited by 
       plaintiff . . . are almost identical to those given by the 
       trial judge: 
 
       You may reject the testimony of a witness if youfind 
       . . . that: 1) the witness intentionally testified falsely 
       . . . about any important fact; or 2)  the witness 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       parts of it as you wish to accept and excluded such parts of it as 
       you wish to exclude . . . . It is not necessary in deciding this 
case to 
       decide the issue of credibility between Mr. Foster and Mr. Weber. 
       That issue is collateral to the main issue here. 
 
Id. at 988. We thought that this instruction asked "the jury to reject or 
accept in whole or in part the testimony of a witness only if the witness 
had lied on a material issue. If a witness had not testified falsely about 
a material issue, the jury may have inferred that it was bound to accept 
the whole of the witness' testimony." Id. at 991. Further, we recalled our 
past approval of Professor Wigmore's words that "a person who would lie 
upon a collateral point is perhaps likely to be a more determined liar 
than one who dares it only upon a material point." Id. (quoting United 
States v. Rutkin, 189 F.2d 431, 439 (3d Cir. 1951) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 
We consider Rockwell and Professor Wigmore's sage remarks, however, 
inapposite to our discussion on willful exaggeration. Since, as has 
previously been stated, "to exaggerate" is not the same as "to falsify" we 
do not think that Rockwell's admonition about the court's charge as it 
relates to willful falsification can be commuted to willful exaggeration. 
Indeed, since the act of exaggerating does not require bad faith, a jury 
should not necessarily apply the same standard to a witness who 
exaggerates as to one who falsifies, if the testimony is irrelevant. 
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       intentionally exaggerated . . . an important fact . . . in 
       order to deceive or mislead you. 
 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). 
However, the portions of Hawaii's instruction that we have 
underlined above clearly demonstrate the weakness in 
Busch's position. Far from being "almost identical" to the 
charge the district court gave here, the emphasized portions 
of the instruction are quite different. That difference 
substantially undermines Busch's position. A jury in 
Hawaii may disregard a witness who intentionally falsifies 
an important fact or who intentionally exaggerates an 
important fact. Clearly, a fact is only "important" if it is 
material. Here, the jury was told it could not reject the 
testimony of a witness who intentionally falsified testimony 
unless the falsification went to a material fact. However, the 
jury was allowed to reject the testimony of a witness who 
willfully exaggerated any fact no matter how immaterial it 
may have been. 
 
Moreover, that error was not harmless. There were no 
witnesses to Dressler's purported fall other than Bellantoni 
and Dressler herself, both of whom testified in a manner 
that may have been considered somewhat exaggerated. In 
addition, no report of the accident was filed, as Dressler 
testified that she could not find any employee to assist her 
after her fall. Furthermore, Busch presented the testimony 
of an expert witness who testified that Dressler could not 
have slipped on the steps and fallen backward facing the 
pool as she testified. Thus, jurors had to decide whether or 
not they believed that Dressler had sustained her burden of 
establishing that she fell at defendant's amusement park in 
the first place before deciding any issues of negligence or 
liability. We cannot ignore the possibility that the jury may 
have improperly rejected the only testimony that could have 
established that Dressler fell. 
 
Nor, are we persuaded to the contrary by Busch's 
reliance upon the rule that we must look at a charge in its 
entirety. Busch argues that, even if the challenged portion 
of the charge is problematic, the charge overall correctly 
informed the jurors of how to assess testimony, and when 
they could reject it. See Appellee's Br. at 20. We agree that 
much of what the court instructed, as set forth above, is a 
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correct statement of the law and was properly included in 
the judge's charge. However, we cannot agree that the 
failure to inform the jury that an exaggeration must be 
material was remedied by the remainder of the charge. 
Although the court's instructions are fairly exhaustive and 
largely correct, we cannot cast a blind eye on the court's 
clear misstatement regarding willful exaggeration. More 
importantly, we cannot expect the jury to do so. We cannot 
assume that the jury will have the wherewithal to heed that 
part of the instruction that is accurate and disregard that 
which is not. Rather, we must assume that if the jurors are 
provided instructions that are partly flawed they may well 
choose the flawed part to inform their duties asfinders of 
fact. Connecticut Mutual, 718 F.2d at 64. ("If the jury was 
misled as to the law on a material point, `we cannot 
presume that the jury applied the appropriate standard in 
deciding [an issue]' "). 
 
Similarly, the deference that we give to the language trial 
courts use in charging a jury does not further Busch's 
position. The problem here is not, as Busch argues, the 
court's exercise of discretion to express the necessary 
principles and concepts in the language it deems most 
appropriate. Rather, the problem here is that the language 
the court did use allowed the jury to reject the testimony of 
a witness for reasons that may have been immaterial to a 
proper evaluation of the evidence. Deference to the 
language of a jury charge does not immunize jury 
instructions when they fail to advise, or misadvise, a jury of 
concepts it needs to know to properly discharge its duties. 
 
Thus, we hold that the district court erred in allowing 
jurors to reject part or all of a witness' testimony merely 
because of a willful exaggeration of a circumstance that was 
not material to Busch's negligence, or any damages 
Dressler sustained. 
 
III. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment and 
order of the district court and remand for a new trial. 
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